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随着社会主义市场经济的逐步建立和发展,作为国家经济监督重要手段之一的价格检查工作,关系到社会的稳定、企业的运行和消费者利益。本文运用博弈理论提出物价部门与企业的博弈模型,对在实施物价检查过程中的物价部门与企业决策行为进行分析,得出影响两者决策行为的关键因素和博弈双方的均衡战略。此后引入责任损失机制,对原有模型进行改进,并将新的均衡点与原来的均衡点对比,认为责任损失机制的引进对物价检查具有重要的促进作用。最后,在上述研究的基础上提出企业物价策略和政府制定相关政策的建议。
With the gradual establishment and development of the socialist market economy, price inspections, one of the most important means of state economic supervision, are related to social stability, the operation of enterprises and the interests of consumers. This paper puts forward the game model of price department and enterprise by game theory, analyzes the decision-making behavior of price departments and enterprises in the course of implementing price inspection, and draws the key factors that affect the decision-making behavior of both and the equilibrium strategy of both parties. Since then, the mechanism of liability loss has been introduced to improve the original model. The new equilibrium point is compared with the original equilibrium point. It is concluded that the introduction of the mechanism of liability loss has an important role in price inspection. Finally, on the basis of the above research, we put forward the suggestions of the enterprise’s price strategy and government’s related policies.