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基于信贷配给理论,提出从专利信息和信号传递两个角度,探讨专利质押对银行信贷决策的影响。结果显示,专利数量和质量信息对银行贷款规模影响显著;低风险企业愿意为贷款提供更多的专利质押,企业通过专利质押传递其风险类型的信号;银行对专利质押量大的低风险企业提供更多的贷款。专利信息能够作为企业信息的重要补充,通过直接和间接两个途径传递信号,为银行提供信贷决策的依据。专利质押在一定程度上缓解了信贷配给问题。
Based on the theory of credit rationing, this paper proposes to discuss the influence of patent pledge on bank credit decision from two aspects of patent information and signal transmission. The results show that the number of patents and quality information have a significant impact on the scale of bank loans; low-risk firms are willing to provide more pledges for loans, enterprises pass the signal of their risk types through pledges of patents; and banks provide low-risk firms with large pledges of patents More loans. Patent information can be used as an important complement to enterprise information to transmit signals through both direct and indirect channels to provide banks with the basis for making credit decisions. Patent pledge to some extent to ease the issue of credit rationing.