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信息的不对称和契约的不完全易导致资本所有人和企业经理人之间发生委托—代理问题。当经理人用别人的钱运作时,不可能期望他如同管理自己的钱财一样用心周到。因而有必要通过某种或某些行为约束机制组合对经理人进行监控,以保证资本所有人的利益。对于缺乏有效外部约束机制的国内风险投资业而言,在契约中引入合理的内部监控条款更为必要。本文认为一个合理的内部监控体系应具有五个方面的作用:(1)行之有效的监控标准,公正、不偏袒的监控手段;(2)用激励的手段促使监控主体努力行使监控行为,收集和反映被监控者的行为信息;(3)对被监控者的行为进行评价,并予以调整,使之趋向于资本所有人的目的;(4)建立完整的组
Asymmetric information and indefinite contracts lead to commission-agency problems between capital owners and corporate managers. When managers work with other people’s money, it is impossible to expect him to be just as attentive as managing his own money. Therefore, it is necessary to supervise the managers by some combination of certain behavior restraint mechanisms to ensure the interests of capital owners. For the domestic venture capital industry that lacks an effective external restraint mechanism, it is more necessary to introduce reasonable internal control provisions in the contract. This paper argues that a reasonable system of internal control should have five functions: (1) effective monitoring standards, fair and impartial monitoring means; (2) by means of incentives to encourage the monitoring body to exercise its monitoring behavior to collect And reflect the behavior of the monitored information; (3) the behavior of the monitored persons are evaluated and adjusted to make it the capital owner’s purpose; (4) the establishment of a complete group