Equilibrium in Repeated Stackelberg Public Goods Game with Two-leadersone-follower and One-step-memo

• 作 者: MuYifen;
• 机 构: Acad.of Mathematics & Sys.Sci.,Chinese Acad.of Sci.
• 出 处: 第八届工业与应用数学国际大会
• 发表日期: 2015年期

　　Stackelberg game with hierarchical and information structures has broad background and applications in practice.In this paper the repeated Stackelberg Public Goods game with 2 leaders and 1 follower will be investigated,where the leaders' strategies are with one-step-memory with respect to the follower's action.The players act simultaneously at each step.By constructing the state transfer graph for given leaders' strategy profile,the equilibrium of the game can be solved.