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以广东省农村小型农田水利治理为实证,从利益相关者角度出发,根据Mende-low的权利-利益矩阵理论模型确定主要利益相关者,利用博弈论方法探讨镇政府与水利所、水利所与村委会、村委会与村民之间的博弈,并分析了影响博弈均衡的主要因素,提出提高利益相关者收益的均衡策略,分析结果为改善广东小型农田水利治理提供思路和参考。
Taking the management of small farmland water conservancy in rural areas of Guangdong Province as an example, from the viewpoint of stakeholders, the main stakeholders were identified according to the Mende-low rights-interest matrix theory model, and the game theory was used to explore the relationship between town government and water conservancy institutes, water conservancy institutes and villages This paper analyzes the main factors that affect the equilibrium of the game, puts forward a balanced strategy to improve the benefits of the stakeholders, and analyzes the results to provide ideas and reference for improving the management of small-scale irrigation in Guangdong.