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中国上市公司期间费用粘性的主要来源是什么?不同类型的期间费用是否存在粘性差异?费用粘性差异的形成与公司治理因素之间有着怎样的内在联系?这些问题的明确对费用管理和公司治理都具有重要意义。本文区分性质各异的销售费用和管理费用,在相关研究的基础上改进研究模型讨论不同类型的期间费用的粘性差异,以进一步分析期间费用粘性的主要来源;而后从第二类代理问题和终极控制权理论出发,探讨控股股东控制权和大股东制衡机制与不同类型期间费用之间的关系,藉以揭示费用粘性差异的成因。本文不仅改进现有关于费用粘性的研究模型,获得了更为可靠的研究结果,而且通过解构期间费用的“黑箱”发现,不同类型期间费用的粘性存在显著差异,管理费用粘性是期间费用粘性的主要来源;进一步地,从第二类代理问题和终极控制权理论的角度,本文解析了大股东对于销售费用和管理费用的选择偏好,发现费用粘性及费用粘性差异是控股股东利用管理费用实施“隧道”行为的结果,揭示了费用粘性差异的形成机理。本文研究结论对于有效约束控股股东通过管理费用实施“隧道”行为、构建有效的大股东制衡机制以及提升公司费用管理水平具有较强的借鉴意义。
What are the main sources of cost stickiness during Chinese listed companies? Are there any sticky differences in the cost of different types of period? What are the intrinsic relations between the formation of cost stickiness and corporate governance factors? These problems are clear for both cost management and corporate governance It is of great significance. This article distinguishes between sales costs and management costs of different nature. Based on the related research, the research model is improved to discuss the stickiness differences of different types of period costs, so as to further analyze the main sources of cost stickiness during the period. Then from the second type agency problem and the ultimate Control theory, discusses the relationship between the controlling shareholder’s controlling power and the check and balance mechanism of major shareholders and the cost of different types of periods, so as to reveal the causes of the differences in cost viscousness. This paper not only improves the current research model on cost stickiness, but also obtains more reliable research results. And through the “black box” of cost during deconstruction, there are significant differences in the stickiness of expenses in different types of periods, and management cost stickiness is the period expense From the perspective of the second type of agency problem and the theory of ultimate control, this paper analyzes the major shareholders’ preference of selling and management fees. It is found that the difference of cost stickiness and cost sticky is that the controlling shareholders use the management fee The results of the “tunneling” implementation revealed the formation mechanism of the difference in cost viscous. The conclusion of this paper is of great reference for the effective restraint of controlling shareholders in implementing “tunneling” through management fees, building an effective check and balance mechanism for large shareholders and improving the management of company expenses.