偷逃税与稽查的税收对策博弈

• 作 者: 宋效中 王哲
• 机 构: 燕山大学,燕山大学 秦皇岛066004,秦皇岛066004
• 出 处: 现代企业教育
• 发表日期: 2006年17期
• 关键词: 偷逃税 稽查 博弈

偷逃税是纳税人作为“理性经济人”的行为倾向,在预期不被稽查的情况下,纳税人的最优策略是偷逃税;而税务机关打击偷逃税实施稽查的深度和广度要受稽查成本的限制。用博弈论的原理和方法探讨偷逃税与稽查的关系,研究如何加强和协调好稽查概率和处罚力度,使不增加稽查成本的同时,减少纳税人选择偷逃税的概率。

Tax evasion is the behavior of the taxpayer as a “rational economic man.” If the taxpayer is not expected to be audited, the taxpayer’s best strategy is to evade tax. The depth and breadth of tax audits against tax evasion by the tax authorities are subject to the cost of inspections limits. Using the principle and method of game theory to explore the relationship between the tax evasion and inspection, to study how to strengthen and coordinate the inspection probability and punishment, so as not to increase the cost of inspection, but also to reduce the probability of taxpayers choosing to evade tax.