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我国股东派生诉讼制度是在2005年新《公司法》中初步确立的。这一制度旨在维护公司的整体利益,防止公司重大利益受到董事、监事和高级管理人员的非法侵害。然而,由于我国《公司法》对股东派生诉讼的原告资格持股比例和持股时间的规定较为笼统,在司法实践中可操作性并不强,使得这一制度的作用大打折扣。本文着重分析股东派生诉讼制度中的缺陷,提出合理完善的意见。
China’s shareholder derivative litigation system was initially established in 2005 in the new Company Law. The system aims to safeguard the overall interests of the company, to prevent the company’s major interests by directors, supervisors and senior management of the illegal. However, since the provisions of the “Company Law” on the plaintiff’s qualification of shareholding and shareholding time in the derivative action of shareholders are relatively general, the operability in judicial practice is not strong, making the role of this system greatly reduced. This article focuses on the analysis of the defects in the system of shareholder derivative litigation, put forward reasonable and perfect opinions.