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经济个体之间的互惠性博弈可以改善个体的福利和博弈双方的福利总合,为“帕累托”状态下整体社会福利的改善提供了潜在的可能性。演化博弈理论为自利性群体向互惠性群体的演化提供了理论支持,从而为整体社会福利扩展的实现奠定了理论基础。根据互惠性演化模型的分析结果,当初始状态下互惠性群体的比例大于某一固定临界值时,该群体将向互惠性群体演化,最终可以实现整体社会福利的扩展。在互惠性群体的演化过程中,需要发挥包括政府在内的第三方要素的阀值性激励功能。
Reciprocity games among economic individuals can improve the welfare of individuals and the sum of benefits of the two parties in the game, providing a potential possibility for the overall improvement of social welfare in the “Pareto” state. Evolutionary Game Theory provides theoretical support for the evolution from self-interested groups to mutually-beneficial groups, which lays a theoretical foundation for the realization of the overall social welfare expansion. According to the analysis of the reciprocal evolution model, when the proportion of the reciprocal groups in the initial state is greater than a certain fixed threshold, the group will evolve towards the mutually-beneficial groups, and eventually the overall social welfare can be expanded. In the evolution of the reciprocal groups, it is necessary to exert the threshold incentive function of the third-party elements including the government.