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随着改革的不断深入,国有企业的投资出现了不少“悖理”行为。尽管这些行为偏离了利润最大化的经营目标,但却是符合理性的经济人行为。本文试图从分析国有企业的利益结构出发进行解释,希望能为这种“悖理”行为提供理论依据。一、国有企业的利益结构分析国有企业的利益结构可以概括为两大层次的委托一代理关系。首先,国家(政府)接受全体人民(初始委托人)的委托成为国有资产产权的代理人;其次,国家(政府)又作为委托人将经营权委托给企业(最终代理人)。在第一层次的委托一代理关系中,全民中的每个人
With the deepening of the reform, there have been many “paradoxes” behaviors in the investment of state-owned enterprises. Although these actions deviate from the goal of maximizing profits, they are rational economic agents. This article attempts to explain from the analysis of the interest structure of state-owned enterprises, hoping to provide a theoretical basis for this “paradox ” behavior. First, the analysis of the interests of state-owned enterprises The structure of the interests of state-owned enterprises can be summarized as two principal-agent relationship. First, the state (the government) accepts the entrustment of the entire people (the initial trustee) as the agent for the property rights of the state-owned assets; second, the state (the government) acts as the trustee to entrust the operation to the enterprise (the ultimate agent). In the first level of trust-agency relationship, everyone in the community