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税收竞争的实质是不完全信息下政府——政府——投资者的多方博弈,而传统的税收竞争研究往往将这一问题简化为完全信息条件下政府-政府间的博弈,投资者被动接受博弈结果,因此传统方法不能分析信息对投资的影响和参与人的行为选择。本文将Bernheim和Whinston的共同代理方法引入税收竞争的研究,研究表明,运用共同代理方法来分析税收竞争,不但可以得到竞争导致“税率下降”、“出口效应”等一般结论,而且还可以解决传统方法所不能解决的信息不对称性问题和参与人的战略行为选择问题,使研究更符合现实。
The essence of tax competition is the multi-party game of government-government-investor under incomplete information. However, the traditional research of tax competition often simplifies this issue to the government-government game under the condition of complete information. The investors passively accept the game As a result, traditional methods can not analyze the impact of information on investment and participant behavior choices. This paper introduces Bernheim and Whinston’s co-agent approach into the research of tax competition. The research shows that the use of co-agent approach to analyze tax competition not only can lead to the general conclusion that competition leads to “tax reduction” and “exit effect” But also solve the problem of information asymmetry that can not be solved by traditional methods and the choice of strategic behavior of participants to make the research more realistic.