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理论上高层经理的持股比例、年度报酬与上市公司经营绩效之间存在显著的正相关关系 ,但是通过选择样本上市公司进行回归分析 ,发现两者并不存在显著的正相关关系。主要原因在于高层经理持股是内部职工持股的一个组成部分 ,是一种福利制度 ;持股制度僵硬 ;持股比例偏低 ,年度报酬过低 ,再加上旧观念的影响 ,很多高层经理不敢拿属于自己的那份收入 ,因此不能产生有效的激励作用。为了提高上市公司的经营绩效 ,首先逐步改变上市公司高层经理的报酬结构 ,将以年度会计盈余为基础的短期激励与以公司价值为基础的长期激励结合起来 ;其次要改进上市公司高层经理的持股制度 ,逐步推广股票期权计划。
Theoretically, there is a significant positive correlation between senior manager's shareholding ratio, annual remuneration and the performance of listed companies, but by choosing the sample listed companies for regression analysis, there is no significant positive correlation between the two. The main reason is that the shareholding of senior managers is an integral part of internal employee stock ownership. It is a kind of welfare system. The system of shareholding is stiff. The shareholding ratio is too low and the annual remuneration is too low. Coupled with the influence of old ideas, many senior managers Dare not take their own share of income, it can not produce effective incentives. In order to improve the operating performance of listed companies, the first step is to change the remuneration structure of the top managers of listed companies, combine the short-term incentive based on annual accounting earnings with the long-term incentive based on the value of the company, and secondly, to improve the holding of senior managers in listed companies Stock system, and gradually promote the stock options plan.