论文部分内容阅读
“去产能”作为供给侧结构性改革五大任务之首,是我国经济转型升级的关键所在。虽已经过近二十年的治理,综合运用了行政、财税、金融、法律等各方面措施,但产能过剩问题不仅未得到明显改善反而显得愈发严重,使得我们不得不反思相关产业政策的有效性。从现有文献来看,大多是从“市场失灵”、“体制扭曲”等方面讨论产能过剩的形成原因,但对去产能政策在实施过程中的影响因素及其执行效果缺乏系统性分析。中央政府和地方政府作为产业政策的制定主体和执行主体,二者的博弈直接影响产业政策的实施效果。本文建立了中央政府和地方政府的演化博弈模型,用以研究分析影响地方政府执行去产能政策效果的相关因素,并对提高去产能政策的执行效果提出了政策建议。
As the first of five major tasks of supply-side structural reform, “going to capacity” is the key to our country’s economic restructuring and upgrading. Although nearly 20 years of governance have been implemented and various measures such as administration, finance, taxation, finance and law have been comprehensively adopted, the overcapacity problem has not only been significantly improved but has become even more serious. This has forced us to reflect on the effectiveness of relevant industrial policies Sex. From the existing literature, most of the reasons for the overcapacity are discussed from the aspects of “market failure ” and “system distortions ”. However, there are no systematic measures to influence the implementation of the CPO policy and its implementation effect Sexual analysis. The central government and local governments, as the main body and executive body of industrial policy, play a direct role in the implementation of industrial policies. This paper establishes an evolutionary game model between the central government and local government to study and analyze the relevant factors that affect the effectiveness of local government’s implementation of the capacity-to-go policy and put forward some policy recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the policy.