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认为默会合作具有规则模糊性、高度的主体相关性、双重性、决策分散性等特点;同时,企业的合作动机不仅来自于互惠从属关系或者避免相互报复,还来自于对总体利益的关注.因此,引入虚拟局中人以体现总体利润的多少,同时提出偏好弃利和η-平衡决策束的概念,并研究了弃利向量集的结构.结果发现在一定条件下企业的弃利向量集是凸集,而且在合作企业的偏好弃利具有不变权重的条件下,系统存在唯一的最小弃利点,以达成或维持默会合作.
They think tacit cooperation has the characteristics of fuzzy rules, a high degree of subject relativity, duality and decentralization of decision-making. At the same time, motivation for cooperation not only comes from reciprocal affiliation or avoids mutual retaliation, but also from concerns about the overall interests. Therefore, we introduce the person in the virtual bureau to reflect the overall profit, at the same time, we put forward the concept of preference preference deduction and η-equilibrium decision-making bundle, and study the structure of the interest rate reduction vector set.It is found that under certain conditions, Convex set, and under the condition that the preference of cooperative enterprises is discarded with the same weight, the system has the only minimum point of abstainment in order to reach or maintain the tacit cooperation.