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研究在一个风险中性供应商和一个风险规避型零售商组成的供应链环境中,用期权合约来协调供应链的问题。通过条件风险值(CVaR)的方法,得到了风险规避型零售商的最优期权采购量,然后进一步求出了供应商的最优期权生产量。结果表明,风险规避型零售商的采购量随着他的风险系数的增加而增加,但要小于传统风险中性零售商的采购量。而供应商的最优期权生产量受缺货惩罚成本的影响。缺货惩罚成本越大,供应商生产全部期权量的概率就会越大。最后,证明了期权合约在风险规避的环境中能够协调供应链的条件。
In a supply chain environment consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer, an option contract is used to coordinate the supply chain. Through the method of CVaR, the optimal option purchase quantity of the risk aversion retailer is obtained, and then the optimal option production quantity of the supplier is obtained. The results show that the risk-averse retailer’s purchasing volume increases with his risk coefficient, but less than that of traditional risk-neutral retailers. The supplier’s optimal option production is affected by the cost of out-of-stock penalty. The greater the cost of out-of-stock penalties, the greater the probability that the supplier will produce the entire option. Finally, it is proved that the option contract can coordinate the supply chain in a risk-averse environment.