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以中国A股上市公司2004～2005年间的1 573个公司年度为样本,以FASB发布的会计信息质量特征为基础对财务报告透明度进行了实证度量,在投资者保护和控股股东与中小股东之间的代理关系的框架内,研究了制度环境、最终控股股东行为对上市公司财务报告透明度的影响。研究发现:最终控股股东的掏空行为显著降低了财务报告透明度;最终控股股东的扶持行为对财务报告透明度的影响不明显;在制度环境较差的地区,财务会计系统可能成为弱投资者保护法律的一种替代机制,上市公司更愿意通过提供高透明度的财务报告补偿投资者法律不足产生的负面影响,验证了拉波塔等(La Porta et al.,1998)的推测。研究还发现,良好的制度环境能够对控股股东的不良行为起到遏制作用。
Taking the sample of China’s A-share listed companies from 2004 to 2005 as 1 573 company years, based on the quality characteristics of the accounting information released by the FASB, an empirical measurement of the transparency of the financial report was conducted, between the investor protection and the controlling shareholders and the small and medium shareholders. Within the framework of the agency relationship, the authors studied the influence of the institutional environment and the ultimate controlling shareholder behavior on the transparency of the financial reporting of listed companies. The study finds that the short-selling behavior of the ultimate controlling shareholder significantly reduces the transparency of the financial report; the supporting behavior of the ultimate controlling shareholder does not have a significant effect on the transparency of the financial report; in regions with poor institutional environment, the financial accounting system may become a weak investor protection law. As an alternative mechanism, listed companies are more willing to compensate for the negative impact of investor legal deficiencies by providing highly transparent financial reports, validating the speculation of Laporta et al. (1998). The study also found that a good institutional environment can play a deterrent to the bad behavior of controlling shareholders.