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本文以2007—2013年上市公司并购事件为研究对象,考察了媒体报道对管理层并购决策行为的影响,以探究新闻媒体的舆论监督职能。研究发现,对于价值有损型并购,媒体报道数量越多,公司管理层放弃执行并购的概率越大,且这一影响主要通过负面新闻报道产生。进一步的考察显示,当并购宣告日市场反应越差或并购方为国有企业时,媒体报道对价值有损型并购的抑制作用越明显,而且媒体报道有助于弱化并购公司政治关联背景对并购决策的不利影响。最后,我们的分析表明,当管理层宣告放弃执行价值有损型并购时,公司存在正的累计超额收益,由此进一步验证了新闻媒体对公司并购决策的监督作用。
This article takes the 2007-2013 mergers and acquisitions of listed companies as the research object, examines the impact of media coverage on M & A decision-making behavior in order to explore the news media’s supervision function of public opinion. The study found that, for lossy value acquisitions, the greater the number of media coverage, the greater the probability that the company’s management will abandon the implementation of M & A, and this impact is mainly generated through negative news coverage. Further investigation shows that when the market response to mergers and acquisitions announced that the worse the market reaction or mergers and acquisitions for the state-owned enterprises, media reports on the value of loss-type mergers and acquisitions more obvious inhibition, and media reports help to weaken the M & A background of the political affiliates of M & A decision-making Adverse effects. Finally, our analysis shows that the positive overstatement of the company’s existence when management declares a waiver of an execution-impaired transaction results in further verifying the media’s oversight of M & A decisions.