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众所周知，信贷市场存在信息不对称现象，即借贷双方不完全了解对方的情况。这种信息不对称包括事前信息不对称和事后不对称。当信贷交易双方存在事前信息不对称时，有信息优势的一方在交易前可能会隐瞒一些信息，导致对方选择错误，产生“逆向选择”。(阿克洛夫，1970)。而当借贷契约签订以后，拥有私人信息的借款人可能违约(表现为借款人将借来的资金投资到风险很高的项目，最终失败从而无法还款，或者即使项目成功，借款人也可能隐瞒收益)，这种现象阿罗称之为“道德风险”。 那么如何解决这种信息不对称导致的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”呢?经济学家分别提出了一些解决措施。对于前者，主要有企业信用等级制度的建立统一授信制度的建立和主办银行制度的建立等。后者包括企业破产的实施、债权转股权、不良债权的化解、企业的兼并组合、社会保障体系的建立等一系列宏观措施。另外诸
As we all know, there is information asymmetry in the credit market, that is, both borrowers and lenders do not fully understand each other’s situation. This information asymmetry includes ex ante information asymmetry and ex post asymmetry. When there is ex ante information asymmetry in both credit transaction parties, the party with information superiority may hide some information before the transaction, resulting in the wrong choice of the other party, resulting in “adverse selection”. (Akerlof, 1970). When a loan deed is signed, a borrower with private information may default (as the borrower invests the borrowed money into a high-risk project, eventually fails to repay, or even if the project succeeds, the borrower may conceal Income), this phenomenon Arrow calls it “moral hazard.” So how to solve this “asymmetric information” and “moral hazard” caused by asymmetric information? Economists have proposed some solutions. For the former, there are mainly the establishment of a unified credit system for the establishment of an enterprise credit rating system and the establishment of a host banking system. The latter includes a series of macro-measures such as the implementation of corporate bankruptcy, the conversion of creditor’s rights into equity, the resolution of non-performing loans, the merger and acquisition of enterprises and the establishment of a social security system. In addition