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分析了公共租赁住房退出管理中赖租问题的现状及起诉手段失效的主要原因。基于演化博弈理论构建了政府部门与承租人间的演化博弈模型,分析了政府部门与承租人各自的行为演化规律和演化稳定策略,确定了起诉的最佳时机与最优比例,并以杭州市蓝桥景苑公共租赁住房小区为例作了算例分析。结果显示:从期望收益的角度看,如果承租人按时退出的比例大于97.81%,则政府管理部门不必起诉;如果赖租者较多,只要起诉的比例大于41.46%,则其余赖租者就会主动选择退出赖租。
Analyzes the status quo of rent-rent in public rental housing and the main reasons for the failure of the means of prosecution. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs the evolutionary game model between government agencies and tenants, analyzes the evolution rules and evolution strategies of government departments and tenants, and determines the optimal timing and optimal proportion of prosecutions. Bridge King Court public rental housing area as an example case analysis. The results show that from the perspective of expected return, government agencies do not need to prosecute if the lessee withdraws on time by more than 97.81%; if the lessee is leased more than 41.46%, the remaining lessee will Take the initiative to opt out of rent.