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本文从信息不对称的视角出发,利用现有的分析框架,分析了信托制度保护受益人的独特机制。由于信托受益人面临更加严重的信息不对称问题,并且受益人没有更好的市场手段(例如,退出权)来解决由此产生的委托代理问题,因此不得不借助道德诉求来保护其利益。这种道德诉求建立在人性基础上,一方面这种诉求逐步形成了受托人利他主义的稳定偏好,另一方面道德诉求通过司法判决上升到具有强制力的法律层面,产生了信义责任和信托财产的独特性。这正是信托制度独具魅力之处,因此英美法系国家的企业年金计划普遍采用信托制。推而广之,信托制度适合那些面临严重信息不对称的交易活动,并且这种不对称产生的委托代理问题无法通过有效的市场机制来解决,特别是当委托人既没有退出权又缺乏能力监督代理人的情况。
From the perspective of information asymmetry, this paper analyzes the unique mechanism of the beneficiaries of the trust system protection by using the existing analytical framework. As the beneficiaries of trust face more serious information asymmetry, and the beneficiaries do not have better market means (for example, the right of withdrawal) to solve the resulting agency problem, they have to protect their interests through moral appeal. This kind of moral appeal is based on the human nature. On the one hand, this kind of appeal gradually forms the stable preference of the altruist of the trustee. On the other hand, the moral appeal rises to the mandatory legal level through the judicatory judgment, resulting in the responsibility of trust and trust Uniqueness This is the unique charm of the trust system. Therefore, trust schemes are generally adopted in enterprise annuity schemes in common law countries. By extension, the trust system is suitable for those trading activities that face serious asymmetric information, and the problem of principal-agent problem arising from such asymmetry can not be solved through effective market mechanism, especially when the principal has neither the right to withdraw nor the ability to supervise The situation of the agent.