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在界定政府和电视传媒两个利益主体特征的基础上,用委托代理理论分析两个利益主体的行为,我们发现如果电视传播的政治任务和经济任务是互相替代的,政府对电视传媒经济任务激励的提升必然影响政治宣传任务,反之亦然。因此,为了完成政治任务,中国电视传媒的经济低效就成为政府理性选择的一个结果。所以,当政府对电视传媒进行改革时,需要考虑信息、两个任务的性质和代理人的风险偏好等因素对代理人决策和行为的影响。
On the basis of defining the characteristics of the two main interests of the government and the TV media, we analyze the behavior of the two stakeholders by using principal-agent theory. We find that if the political task and the economic task of TV communication are alternative to each other, the government encourages the TV media economic task The promotion must inevitably affect the political propaganda task, and vice versa. Therefore, in order to accomplish the political task, the economic inefficiency of Chinese TV media has become a result of the government’s rational choice. Therefore, when the government reforms the television media, it is necessary to consider the influence of information, the nature of the two tasks and the risk preference of the agent on the decision-making and behavior of the agent.