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1951年8月17日,彭德怀以中朝联合司令部名义,下达第六次战役的预备命令。随后,志愿军政治部发布了第六次战役的政治工作指示,对全军进行政治动员。在开城参加谈判的志愿军副司令员邓华接到命令的电报后,发电报给彭德怀说:当前敌人已有强大纵深的强固设防,又是现代化的立体防御,如果我们以现有力量和装备进行攻击,伤亡和消耗会很大。如果敌人离开自己的阵地,大举向我进攻,我以现有力量装备,是可以将敌人打垮的,而求得部分歼敌,代价也不会很大。邓华同时建议:如果目前不立即进行战役反击,也应当尽可能作战术反击,收复一些地方,将我与敌人的接触线向前推进,以便于我更好地了解敌人阵地情况及其坚固程度。彭德怀复电同意邓华的意见。
On August 17, 1951, Peng Dehuai issued a preliminary order for the Sixth Campaign in the name of the Joint Command of China and the DPRK. Subsequently, the CPV Political Department issued the political work instructions for the sixth campaign and carried out political mobilization for the entire army. Deng Hua, deputy commander of the volunteer army who took part in the negotiations in Kaesong, telegraphed to Peng Dehuai after telegraphed the order: "At present, the enemy has a strong fortification in depth and a modern three-dimensional defense. If we use existing forces and equipment To attack, casualties and consumption will be great. If the enemy left his position and attacked me aggressively, I would be able to defeat the enemy with the equipment I have, and it will not be costly to seek some of the enemy. Deng Hua also suggested: If you do not immediately fight back, it should tactical counterattack as possible, recover some places, the line of contact with my enemy to move forward so that I can better understand the position of the enemy positions and their solidity . Peng Dehuai agrees with Deng Hua’s remarks.