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本文以沪深证券交易所2003~2014年上市公司为样本,通过对不同公司盈余管理水平和模式与证监会处罚的相关性,以及证监会处罚后公司盈余管理策略变化的分析,检验证监会盈余管理监管的有效性。研究结果表明,证监会能够识别民营上市公司的盈余管理行为,并可根据其程度做出相应的处罚,但证监会处罚与国有上市公司的盈余管理活动是不相关的。从不同盈余管理模式的监管来看,证监会对民营上市公司利用非经常性损益、应计盈余管理和基于生产的真实盈余管理的监管是有效的,而对操纵销售和酌量性费用的真实盈余管理的监管则是无效的。进一步研究还发现,证监会处罚能够显著抑制国有上市公司和民营上市公司的非经常性损益,对应计盈余管理和异常酌量性费用没有影响,但会促使企业使用更多异常营业现金流量和异常生产成本管理盈余。上述结果显示,证监会对国有和民营上市公司盈余管理行为,以及不同盈余管理模式的监管存在很强的选择性监管问题,其处罚也未显著减少上市公司的盈余管理行为,只是导致公司的盈余管理策略发生了变化。
Based on the sample of listed companies of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2003 to 2014, this paper examines the changes of the earnings of the CSRC through the analysis of the correlation between the earnings management level and mode of different companies and the punishment of the CSRC and the change of the company’s earnings management strategy after the CSRC punishment. The effectiveness of regulatory control. The results show that CSRC can identify the earnings management behavior of private listed companies and can make corresponding penalties according to their level. However, the punishment of CSRC is irrelevant to the earnings management activities of state-owned listed companies. From the perspective of the supervision of different models of earnings management, the CSRC is effective in supervising the use of non-recurring gains and losses, accrued earnings management and production-based real earnings management by private listed companies, while the real profit-making over the sales and discretionary expenses Management regulation is invalid. Further study also found that the SFC punishment can significantly inhibit the non-recurring gains and losses of state-owned listed companies and private listed companies, accounting accruals and unusual discretionary costs have no effect, but will enable enterprises to use more abnormal operating cash flow and abnormal production Cost Management Surplus. The above results show that there is a strong selective regulatory problem for the Earnings Management behavior of state-owned and private listed companies and the regulation of different Earnings Management models. The penalty does not significantly reduce the earnings management behavior of listed companies, but only leads to the surpluses of the Company Management strategy has changed.