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混合所有制是供给侧结构性改革背景下国有企业改革的重要方向,国有股比例、富余人员的安置、非国有资本是否愿意进入是制约改革成效的重要因素,需要把握好分寸。通过构建混合所有制背景下由国有企业与非国有投资者组成的动态序贯博弈模型,将非国有资本进入决策及软预算约束纳入分析,探索国有股最优比例以及科学的员工安置政策。得出结论认为,国有股比例是一个动态变量,受多种因素的综合影响;在硬预算约束及软预算约束的情况下,国有股比例受员工安置政策的影响明显;非国有资本是否投资受进入成本、国有股比例、软预算约束等因素的影响,进入成本在一定范围内才可以吸引非国有资本投资。
Mixed ownership is an important direction for state-owned enterprises reform in the context of supply-side structural reforms. The proportion of state-owned shares, the placement of redundant personnel and the willingness of non-state-owned capital to enter are important factors that restrict the effectiveness of the reform. By constructing a dynamic sequential game model consisting of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned investors under the background of mixed ownership, the non-state capital into the decision-making and soft budget constraints into the analysis, to explore the optimal proportion of state-owned shares and scientific staff placement policy. Concluded that the proportion of state-owned shares is a dynamic variable, subject to a combination of many factors; in the case of hard budget constraints and soft budget constraints, the proportion of state-owned shares affected by the placement of employees significantly affected; non-state-owned capital investment by the cost of entry , The proportion of state-owned shares, soft budget constraints and other factors, the cost of access within a certain range can attract non-state capital investment.