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研究象征式竞购合谋这种典型合谋方式的均衡策略问题。考虑到竞购双方估值信息的不完全,以拍卖理论中的竞标模型为基础,确定了合谋激励条件,求解了合理的利益补偿价值,并在此基础上通过博弈分析得出了竞购合谋的均衡策略,最后分析了目标公司针对竞购双方合谋在保留价格上的响应策略。研究表明,竞购者合谋并未降低收购活动的经济效益,目标公司能够通过设定合理的保留来抑制合谋行为的发生。
This paper studies the equilibrium strategy of the typical collusion of symbolic bidding collusion. Taking into account the incompleteness of the bidding information of both parties, based on the bidding model in the auction theory, the condition of collusive motivation is determined and the reasonable compensation value is obtained. On this basis, the bidding collusion is obtained through the game analysis Finally, it analyzes the target company’s strategy of responding to the collusion between bidders on the reserve price. Research shows that the bidder collusion did not reduce the economic benefits of the acquisition, and the target company can curb the collusion by setting reasonable reservations.