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不同于企业技术创新过程,政府部门经常会采用固定奖励竞赛方式激励投标商参与公共产品技术创新。本文分析了技术溢出条件对政府部门确定最优奖励额度以及偏袒规则的影响问题。研究了投标企业研发能力高低,可能发生的技术溢出效果,技术评价过程中不确定性等因素对政府制定最优偏袒规则的影响效果:不存在技术溢出情况下,政府部门如果希望实现最大社会福利,则应选择公平竞赛的方式;在发生技术溢出情况下,技术溢出效果限定了对两个异质性投标商的最高偏袒程度。
Different from the process of technological innovation in enterprises, government departments often use fixed incentive competitions to encourage bidders to participate in technological innovation of public products. This article analyzes the impact of technology spillover conditions on the government department to determine the optimal reward limit and bias rules. It studies the influence of the R & D capability of the bidding enterprises, the possible spillover effect of technology, the uncertainty in the process of technology evaluation and other factors on the formulation of the optimal favoritism by the government. In case there is no technology spillover, if the government wants to realize the maximum social welfare , The fair competition should be chosen; in the case of technology spillovers, the effect of technology spillover limits the maximum degree of partiality to two heterogeneous bidders.