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关于传统的公有制经济中由委托代理关系所形成的复杂链式结构所引致的系统运行效率低下问题及由此产生的弊病,已有部分学者进行了深入探讨:张维迎从监督技术的角度出发,严密证明了初始委托人的最优监督积极性和最终代理人在受监督下的最优努力程度都随系统规模的扩大而严格递减;段文斌则通过代理人选择模型证明传统国有企业在选择的有效性和对经理的激励作用方面劣于公司制企业。本文拟结合熵—信息理论,
Some scholars have conducted in-depth discussions on the inefficiencies of system operation and the resulting shortcomings caused by the complicated chain structure formed by the principal-agent relationship in the traditional public-owned economy. Zhang Weiying, from the perspective of supervising technology, It proves that the initial client’s optimal supervision enthusiasm and the ultimate agent’s supervised under the supervision of the severity of the system with the expansion of strictly reduced; Duan Wenbin through the agent selection model to prove the traditional state-owned enterprises in the choice of the effectiveness and Incentives for managers are inferior to those of corporate companies. This paper intends to combine entropy - information theory,