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休谟的自然主义伦理学主张道德性质被理解为我们的情感和态度在适当条件下的投射(即投射主义),并且认为道德来源于我们人性的内部。这个自然主义面临两个批评:不能充分说明规范性,道德主张的有效性变得是相对的。这篇文章回应这两个批评,主张休谟的自然主义伦理学能够更好地解释关于道德性质的两个本质特征:a,道德判断往往具有引导行动的职能;b,道德主张具有客观有效性。两个竞争性的理论——康奈尔学派的道德实在论和托马斯·内格尔的道德理性主义——接受一种道德实在论(道德性质,作为一种道德实在,像物理性质一样是实际存在于世界中的实在)和相应的道德真理概念。这篇文章批评这两个理论,论证都不能成功地解释a和b。
Hume’s naturalistic ethics argues that the moral character is understood as the projection of our emotions and attitudes under appropriate conditions (ie, projectingism) and that morality comes from the inside of our humanity. This naturalism faces two criticisms: the normativeness can not be fully explained and the validity of the moral claim becomes relative. In response to these two critiques, this article argues that Hume’s naturalistic ethics can better explain two essential traits about the nature of morality: a. Moral judgments often have the function of leading actions; b. Ethical claims are objective and effective. Two competing theories-Cornell school’s moral realism and Thomas Nagel’s moral rationalism-accept a moral realism (morality as a moral reality, as physical as physical reality The reality that exists in the world) and the corresponding concepts of moral truth. This article criticizes both theories, argumentation can not successfully explain a and b.