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激励规制理论关于委托代理及其对应的参与约束和激励约束的分析,通常集中在以公用事业的委托代理为主要研究对象的产业和部门,而对流通产业有可能存在的相关问题并没有给以足够的关注。其实,流通产业中的委托代理关系,同样存在着厂商的参与约束和激励约束问题。本文在简要评说有关委托代理的激励性规制理论的基础上,认为要实现厂商满足于参与约束和激励约束之相容的较好结果,可以考虑糅合现有的理论成果并根据我国的具体实际,在框架设计上为地方政府委托代理提供一些思路;作为一种理论探讨,文章对地方政府之于厂商的参与约束和激励约束之相容问题进行了讨论。
Incentive regulation theory Analysis of the principal-agent and its corresponding participation constraints and incentive constraints usually focus on the industries and sectors that mainly take the principal-agent of the public utilities, but the related problems that may exist in the circulation industry are not given Enough attention. In fact, the principal-agent relationship in the circulation industry also involves the participation and restriction of manufacturers. On the basis of a brief comment on the theory of incentive regulation of principal-agent, this paper argues that if we want to achieve the better result that manufacturers are satisfied with the compatibility of participation constraint and incentive constraint, we can consider combining the existing theoretical results and according to our country’s concrete reality, In the framework of the design for the local government agency to provide some ideas; as a theoretical study, the article discusses the compatibility of local government firms in the participation constraints and incentives constraints are discussed.