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备受世人瞩目、被誉为“金融监管新标尺”的2010年美国《多得—弗兰克华尔街改革与消费者保护法》本质上是美国国会政治过程与集团斗争的结果。美国金融监管立法过程中五大利益集团的矛盾均在联邦国会层面有不同程度的表现。党派之争、选举估算与利益集团对美国金融立法与议员投票影响颇深,表现为按政党划分选票,同时少数议员的背离党派行为深受背后政治捐款的利益集团影响。一个代表性的案例是金融高管薪酬议题中的议员选举估算。总之,美国的党治国会、议员背后的利益集团与政治交易实质性地开启并塑造后金融危机时代的美国金融监管新格局。
The “Made in America - Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Law” of 2010, which is praised as “the new gauge of financial regulation” by the world, is essentially the result of the political process and the group struggle in the US Congress. The contradictions of the five major interest groups in the process of the legislation on financial supervision in the United States all have different degrees of performance at the level of the Federal Parliament. Partisan controversy, election estimates, and interest groups have had a profound effect on U.S. financial legislation and the voting of parliamentarians, as reflected by the votes divided by political parties and by the interest groups behind the political contributions by the minority members. A representative case is the estimation of MPs in the financial executive compensation agenda. In short, the U.S. party governing the parliament, the interest groups behind the parliamentarians and the political transactions have opened up substantively and shaped the new pattern of U.S. financial regulation after the financial crisis.