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南方三年游击战争初期,留在中央苏区的党组织和红军,经历了从正规战到游击战的战略转变过程,为此付出了惨痛的代价。本文拟对这一战略转变过程中的有关重大决策问题作些剖析。一 1934年10月,中央苏区第五次反“围剿”面临着失败,在中共中央和中革军委率领中央红军主力进行长征前夕,曾对中央苏区今后的斗争作了具体部署。在组织上,在中央苏区留下一部分党政军干部和主力红军第二十四师、十几个地方红军独立团以及其他地方群众武装,总人数约3至4万人。在苏区设立中共中央分局、中央军区和中华苏维埃中央政府办事处,由项英
In the early years of the three-year guerrilla war in the south, the party organizations and the Red Army left in the Central Soviet Area experienced a strategic shift from a regular war to a guerrilla war and paid a painful price. This article intends to analyze some of the major decision-making issues in the course of this strategic transformation. In October 1934, the fifth anti-encirclement campaign in the Central Soviet Area faced a failure. On the eve of the long march between the CPC Central Committee and the Central Military Commission led by the Central Red Army, the Central Government has made concrete plans for future fighting in the Central Soviet Area. Organically, they left a part of the party and government military cadres and the main Red Army 24th Division and a dozen local Red Army independence groups and other local armed groups in the Central Soviet Area with a total population of about 30,000 to 40,000. In the Soviet Area set up the CPC Central Branch, the Central Military Region and the Chinese Soviet Central Government offices, from the British