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以在控制权私利驱动下公司的非效率投资为研究对象,考察了增长期权对控股股东的非效率投资决策和公司价值的影响,并分析了产生影响的内在机理.研究表明,存在控股股东的公司会产生投资不足行为,但当公司拥有增长期权时,由于控股股东偏好控制权私利的可持续性,增长期权能够减轻投资不足程度,使得控股股东的投资决策与公司价值最大化目标更加一致,显示出增长具有激励作用.同时,投资不足程度会随着,增长因子的增大和控股股东所占股份增加,而得到更快、更明显的缓解,而且在此过程中公司价值将会上升.
Taking the non-efficiency investment driven by the private interests of control as the research object, the paper investigates the impact of growth options on the non-efficiency investment decisions and corporate value of the controlling shareholders and analyzes the internal mechanisms that have an impact on the controlling shareholders. However, when the company owns the growth option, due to the sustainability of the preference interest of controlling shareholders, the growth option can reduce the degree of underinvestment and the controlling shareholder’s investment decision is more consistent with the goal of maximizing the company value. Which shows that the growth has an incentive effect.At the same time, the degree of underinvestment will get faster and more obvious mitigation with the increase of growth factor and the increase of the controlling shareholder’s share, and in the process, the company’s value will rise.