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本文根据我国有关环境保护的基本制度,建立了一个经济博弈理论模型,据此分析认为在目前的管理制度下,我国的水资源治理必然是一个低治理、高污染的均衡结果,虽然短期内可以用政府行政命令的形式达到治理目标,但这种方法是内在矛盾的,不能长期保持的和低效率的。因此,只有改变目前的管理制度,主要是免除地方政府对环境保护的决定权,改变对环境治理的负责体系,才能根本提高我国的环境治理水平并提高污染控制的效率。
Based on the basic system of environmental protection in our country, this paper establishes a theoretical model of economic game theory. Based on this analysis, under the current management system, China’s water resources governance is inevitably a balanced result of low governance and high pollution. Although short-term Goals are achieved in the form of government executive orders, but this approach is inherently contradictory and can not be sustained and inefficient. Therefore, only by changing the present management system, mainly eliminating the local government’s decision-making power over environmental protection and changing the system of responsibility for environmental governance, can we basically raise the level of environmental governance in our country and improve the efficiency of pollution control.