论文部分内容阅读
作者指出,布鲁尔选择性地忽略了许多相关的哲学文献,把少数人的观点等同于哲学家的主流观点,其对所谓哲学家观点的批评实际上是在与稻草人作斗争。作者认为,科学知识并非都具有因果性,即使有也未必普遍具有社会学特性;而强纲领中的公正性和反身性论题都是因果性论题的必然结果,它们也是多余的。他把对称性论题细分为认识论对称、合理性对称和实用对称,并指出了它们的问题。他论证说科学理论和理论的选择未必都具有社会性,强纲领也没有被证明比其他解释科学的理论更科学,如果对称性论题难以成立,强纲领就不能称作“强”纲领。
The author points out that Brewer selectively ignores many relevant philosophical documents, equates minority views with philosophers ’mainstream viewpoints, and criticizes so-called philosophers’ views in actuality with the Scarecrow. The author believes that not all scientific knowledge is causal, and societies may not always be universally available. The fair and reflexive topics in the strong programs are all inevitable consequences of causal issues, and they are superfluous. He subdivides the topic of symmetry into epistemological symmetry, rational symmetry and practical symmetry, and points out their problems. He argued that the choice of scientific theories and theories may not all be social, and that strong programs have not proved more scientific than other theories that explain science. Strong programs can not be called “strong” programs if it is difficult to establish a symmetrical topic.