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《职务发明条例草案(送审稿)》很大程度上借鉴了德国模式,试图通过细化管制促进创新。管制模式试图确保发明人报酬与发明贡献挂钩。这意味着国家必须实质干预单位内部的资源调配与劳资双方的奖酬约定。多方面的实证研究表明,如果将德国作为职务发明管制的制度实验室,其近六十年的试验结果是令人失望的。干预第一在国家层面恶化了创新环境,第二在单位层面造成了巨大负担,第三在个人层面侵蚀了发明人的长远利益。我国若希望完善职务发明制度,需要以此为鉴,避免强化管制。
“The invention of invention bill (draft for review)” largely draws on the German model, trying to promote innovation through detailed regulation. The regulatory model seeks to ensure that the remuneration of inventors is linked to the contribution to invention. This means that the state must substantively intervene in the unit's internal resources allocation and labor and capital rewards and rewards. Various empirical studies show that the test results of nearly six decades of disappointment in using Germany as a system laboratory for the control of job-creation inventions. Intervention first deteriorated the environment for innovation at the national level. The second posed a huge burden on the unit level and the third eroded the inventor's long-term interest at the individual level. If we want to perfect the system of job-setting invention, we should learn from it and avoid strengthening the control.