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在法人治理结构中，由于信息不对称条件下的所有者与经营者之间的委托代理关系的存在，出现“费劲的状态验证问题”。本文在通过对所有者、企业、经营者之间博弃过程分析的基础上，提出经营者“股权协议回购”持股方式，建立起“激励强度与有效激励对等、有效监督与个人行为风险成本对等、个人利益与企业利益实现对等”原则下的经营者选择、激励、监督有机结合的运行机制。
In the corporate governance structure, due to the existence of the principal-agent relationship between the owner and the operator under the condition of information asymmetry, “strenuous status verification problem” appears. Based on the analysis of the abandonment process among owners, enterprises and managers, this paper puts forward the shareholding method of “repurchase of shareholding agreement” among managers, and establishes the relationship between incentive intensity and effective incentive equivalence, effective supervision and personal behavior Risk equalization of the cost, the personal interests and the interests of enterprises to achieve reciprocity "under the principle of the operator to choose, motivate and supervise the organic combination of the operating mechanism.