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具有需求信息优势的企业常常将广告投入作为市场需求信号,有选择地向其互补品生产企业传递需求信息,以刺激其增加广告投入,通过溢出效应获取更大收益。针对这一问题,本文建立了考虑溢出效应的互补品企业间广告决策的信号博弈模型,得到了分离均衡和混同均衡的存在条件,分析了均衡状态下企业的最优广告决策和收益,讨论了企业的广告策略选择。结果表明,分离均衡下,具有信息优势的制造商无法利用广告投入信号刺激其互补品制造商增加广告投入。混同均衡下,只有当市场需求为低时,具有信息优势的制造商能够利用广告投入信号,刺激其互补品制造商增加广告投入,通过溢出效应获得更大收益。最后,通过一个数值算例验证了有关结论的有效性。
Enterprises with the advantage of demand information often regard advertisement input as the signal of market demand and selectively transmit the demand information to their complementary manufacturing enterprises in order to stimulate them to increase their advertising investment and obtain greater benefits through the spillover effect. In order to solve this problem, this paper establishes a signal game model of advertising decision-making between complementary enterprises considering the spillover effect, and obtains the existence conditions of separation equilibrium and mixture equilibrium, analyzes the optimal advertising decision and return of enterprises in equilibrium, and discusses Business advertising strategy choices. The results show that, under the equilibrium of separation, manufacturers with information superiority can not use the advertising input signal to stimulate their complementary manufacturers to increase their advertising investment. Only when the market demand is low, manufacturers with information superiority can use the signals of advertising to stimulate their complementary manufacturers to increase their advertising investment and obtain greater benefits through the spillover effect. Finally, a numerical example is used to verify the validity of the conclusion.