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近来在各方对次贷危机的反思中,次贷经纪商的道德风险开始受到政府、学界的关注。本文分析了经纪商、贷款公司、借款人三方的共同代理关系,指出次贷市场上经纪商不合理的佣金制是导致这一共同代理问题的症结所在。由于在原共同代理模型内求解无效,本文尝试为经纪商设计一个新的激励报酬支付形式,即由贷款公司向经纪商支付报酬,变共同代理为传统的双边代理,并通过比较改变控制权后私人收益和社会福利的增减,进一步表明由贷款公司发放激励报酬、获得对经纪商行为的控制权能够改善对经纪商道德风险的治理,增进贷款公司收益和社会福利。
Recently, in all the parties’ reflections on the subprime mortgage crisis, the moral hazard of subprime mortgage brokers has begun to receive the attention of the government and academia. This article analyzes the common agency relationship among brokers, loan companies and borrowers. It points out that the unreasonable commission system of brokers in subprime mortgage market is the crux of the common agency problem. Because of the ineffective solution in the original common proxy model, this paper tries to design a new form of incentive compensation for the brokers, that is, the loan company pays the brokers the compensation, changes the common agent into the traditional bilateral agent and changes the control right The increase and decrease of benefits and social benefits further indicate that the payment of incentive remuneration by the loan companies and the acquisition of control over the broker behavior can improve the governance of the moral hazard of brokers and increase the return on corporate loans and social welfare.