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这篇文章对比了转轨经济中国家指导型和市场调节型两种企业所有制改革的途径,并区分了由A.C.Pigou和RonaldCoase提出的解决共有资源外部性的两种理论方法。接下来以Coase的理论为基础就产权分配,竞争程度和交易成本的本质等问题对中国新兴的产权市场进行了评估。中国近年来的成功经验表明:尽管现实情况据科斯理论所要求的理想条件假设还有很大差距,但是致力于扩大所有权交易范围的政策还是极大的促进了生产率和效率的提高。现在,中国面临的重大抉择是在重组过程中究竟应当以市场调节为基础,还是应当以行政手段为基础。
This article compares the ways of ownership reform in the two types of enterprises in the transitional economy and in the market-regulated economy. It also distinguishes two theoretical approaches proposed by A.C. Pigou and RonaldCoase in addressing the externalities of shared resources. Next, based on Coase’s theory, we evaluate China’s emerging property market on the issues of property distribution, competition and the nature of transaction costs. The successful experience of China in recent years shows that despite the fact that there is still a long way to go if the reality is based on the ideal conditions assumptions required by Coase’s theory, the policies devoted to expanding the scope of ownership transactions have greatly contributed to the improvement of productivity and efficiency. At present, the major choice facing China is whether it should be based on market regulation or on the basis of administrative measures in the process of reorganization.