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考虑品牌零售商利用其买方势力要求上游供应商提高供应给其产品的安全水平,针对供应商与品牌零售商,建立两阶段博弈模型:第一阶段为供应商确定对品牌零售商的批发价格,第二阶段为品牌零售商与普通零售商在消费者市场进行基于Hotelling模型并考虑产品安全差异的竞争,并确定产品销售价格。通过数值仿真讨论了品牌零售商确定的产品安全水平变化时带来的影响。结果表明:品牌零售商确定的产品安全水平提高时,品牌零售商的市场份额、利润水平都增加,而供应商的利润水平则逐渐减少。所得结论对于品牌零售商有效促进供应商的提高产品安全水平有指导意义。
Considering brand retailers use their buyer power to require upstream suppliers to improve the safety of their products supplied to their products, a two-stage game model is established for suppliers and brand retailers. The first phase is for suppliers to determine the wholesale price for brand retailers, The second stage is for brand retailers and retailers to compete in the consumer market based on the Hotelling model and consider differences in product safety, and to determine the selling prices of the products. Through numerical simulation, we discuss the impact of changes in the level of product safety determined by brand retailers. The results show that when brand retailers determine the level of product safety, the brand retailers’ market share and profit level increase, while the profit margins of suppliers decrease. The conclusion is of guiding significance for brand retailers to effectively promote supplier’s level of product safety.