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我们通过私募资金市场(private capital mar- ket)搜寻模型的均衡,来研究投资者保护对外部融资可得性(availability)、企业家才能(entrepreneurship)和创业所产生的影响。除了搜寻成本(friction)之外,我们还考察了合约成本,特别是由于企业家(entrepre- neur)可能侵夺融资人(financier)所导致的事中和事后(expost)道德风险问题。在我们的模型中,政府选择投资者保护水平,以确定项目盈余(match surplus)在创业者与融资人之间的可转让性。结果表明任何鼓励(抑制)企业家才能的做法也会鼓励(抑制)创业。因此,投资者保护的创业效应取决于各种搜寻成本和合约成本的相对影响。只有当投资者保护对与事中道德风险相比的事后道德风险问题产生更大的影响时,加强投资者保护才能促进创业。我们也发现搜寻成本削弱了投资者保护的积极效应,同时,合约成本则修正了标准的荷氏(Hosios)效率条件。
We look at the equilibrium of the model through private capital mar- ket to study the impact of investor protection on the availability, entrepreneurship and entrepreneurship of external financing. In addition to the cost of friction, we examined the cost of contracts, in particular the issue of ethical and expostoral morality caused by the possible involvement of entrepre- neurists in the financing of financiers. In our model, the government chooses the level of investor protection in order to determine the transferability of the project surplus between the entrepreneur and the financier. The result shows that any encouragement (inhibition) of entrepreneurship also encourages (stifles) entrepreneurship. Thus, the entrepreneurial effect of investor protection depends on the relative impact of various search and contract costs. Only when investor protection has a greater impact on the issue of moral hazard later in life than moral hazard in the matter, strengthening investor protection can promote entrepreneurship. We also find that search costs have weakened the positive effect of investor protection while contract costs have revised for standard Hosios efficiency conditions.