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本文考察了不同改制模式对于董事会特征的影响。通过分析1997—2000年我国285个国有企业首次公开发行后三年的数据,我们发现控股股东控制上市公司和董事会的动机及监管层政策规定是影响董事会领导层两职状态的重要原因。非完整改造公司中,控股股东更容易违反监管层的有关规定,委派本公司人员在上市公司同时兼任董事长和总经理职位。同时,非完整改造公司董事会的规模较大,董事会的活动强度较低,其激励程度也较低。
This article examines the impact of different modes of restructuring on board characteristics. By analyzing the data of the three years after initial public offering of 285 state-owned enterprises in China from 1997 to 2000, we find that the motivation of controlling shareholders to control the listed companies and the board of directors and the regulatory policies and regulations are the important reasons that affect the status of the leadership of the board of directors. In the non-integrated transformation company, the controlling shareholder is more likely to violate the relevant regulations of the regulatory authorities and appoints the staff of the Company to concurrently serve as the chairman and the general manager of the listed company. At the same time, the board of directors of the non-integrated transformation company is relatively large in scale, the activity of the board of directors is lower, and its motivation is lower.