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有关苏共二十大早年公布的文件以及最新解密的档案文献表明,斯大林去世后,苏联党内活动和社会趋向预示了改革的基础,二十大路线的理论前提是客观存在的。而对斯大林的个人崇拜是苏联社会变革的一条不可逾越的鸿沟,因此,对于斯大林的批判,就其本质而言,是要以此为铺垫改变斯大林的某些政策和做法,平反历史冤案的社会浪潮不过是为赫鲁晓夫提供了一个机会。囿于认识能力和传统思想,苏共二十大并没有从社会变革的层面提出改造社会主义政治经济体制的根本任务,而仅限于政策性调整和某些具体措施的实施。但无论如何,二十大提供了一种改弦易辙的可能性,一个摆脱斯大林模式束缚的历史机会。对于苏共二十大路线,中共中央最初是完全赞同的。对于批判斯大林的个人崇拜,毛泽东在内心是满意的,只是不同意在一般意义上否定个人崇拜。至于探索中国自己的发展道路,毛泽东在《论十大关系》中的论述与苏联的改革措施及苏共二十大的总结报告相比较,没有更多的新东西。毛泽东认为需要引为借鉴的也是斯大林模式的弊病,而这正是斯大林去世后苏联新领导人已经考虑并在二十大正式提出的问题。从本质上讲,苏共和中共当时都没有摆脱斯大林所指引的道路,毛泽东不过要通过采用那些自己熟悉的方法比苏联走得更快些。正是在这种思维方式下,中共八大继续探索而产生的思想火花,很轻易地就在突然爆发的波匈事件和反右派运动中熄灭了。
The documents published in the early 20th year of the CPSU and the latest archives of the declassified documents show that after the death of Stalin, the party activities and social trends in the Soviet Union have foreshadowed the basis for the reform. The theoretical premise of the Twentieth Route represents an objective reality. The personal worship of Stalin is an insurmountable gap between the social transformations of the Soviet Union. Therefore, Criticism of Stalin, by its very nature, is to use this as a cushion to change some of Stalin’s policies and practices and to rehabilitate history of injustice The wave is but an opportunity for Khrushchov. In understanding ability and traditional thinking, the Twentieth National Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not propose the fundamental task of reforming the socialist political and economic system from the aspect of social change, but only limited to the policy adjustment and the implementation of some specific measures. However, the Twentieth Congress provided a possibility of a change of course, a historic opportunity to get out of the shackles of the Stalinist model. For the Twenty Route of the CPSU, the CPC Central Committee initially fully agreed. To criticize Stalin’s personal worship, Mao Zedong was satisfied with himself, but disagreed with denying personal worship in a general sense. As for exploring China’s own development path, Mao Zedong’s discussion in his article “On the Ten Major Relations” has nothing more to do with the reform measures of the Soviet Union and the summary report of the 20th CPSU. What Mao Tse-tung considered necessary for reference was also the ills of the Stalin model, which was exactly what the new Soviet leaders considered and put forward at the twentieth formality after Stalin’s death. Essentially, the CPSU and the CCP did not get out of the path led by Stalin at that time, but Mao Tse-tung was going to go faster than the Soviet Union by adopting methods that he knew himself. It is in this mode of thinking that the ideological sparks that the Eighth Congress of the CPC has continued to explore are easily extinguished in the sudden waves of the events in Poland and Hungary and the anti-rightist movement.