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在过去的几年中,西方战略家们一直在讨论着一个问题:作为中国整体核战略的一个重要组成部分,日渐壮大的中国战略核潜艇舰队到底预示着什么?一家颇有影响的智库认为,传统的陆基弹道导弹力量在过去的几十年里很好地满足了中国的战略需求,未来仍将在中国核威慑体系中继续扮演核心的角色.但是许多人对这一观点表示不以为然,并举出了解放军已经或即将服役的新一代机动型陆基弹道导弹和新一代战略核潜艇作为证据来证明己方的观点。他们认为中国很快将会建成一支全新的、更能同美国海军相抗衡的战略核潜艇舰队,这支水下舰队无论是在质量还是数量上都将有质的提高.此外,中国也将放弃多年以来一直坚持的“最低限度核威慑”政策,转而奉行更加自信、也更具攻击性的“有限核威慑”政策。我们(指本文原作者,译者注,下同)将主要对中国未来的核威慑战略、学说和战略核潜艇力量的实力进行评判,而对水下核威慑力量将只在战略层面进行探讨,其余的问题,诸如中国是否会以及如何利用战略核潜艇对台湾地区或其他国家施加军事压力等,不在本文的讨论范围内.我们的主要观点是,建设一支规模更大、现代化程度更高、综合实力更强的战略核潜艇舰队,并不一定就意味着中国将放弃长久以来一直坚持的“最低限度核威慑”政策。事实上也正如中国所认为的那样,一支适度强大的水下核威慑力量将会提高“最低限度核威慑”政策的有效性。为了讲明这个观点,这里首先将对美苏英法等国水下核威慑体系的发展历程进行简短的回顾,对于它们在这一领域所取得的成就做一检视,同时也与中国在这一领域的发展进行一下比较。然后我们将尝试对中国战略核潜艇部队未来的规模和部署模式进行分析和评估。
In the past few years, Western strategists have been discussing a question: As an important part of China’s overall nuclear strategy, what is the herald of a growing Chinese strategic nuclear submarine fleet? An influential think tank believes that the traditional Of land-based ballistic missiles have met China’s strategic needs well in the past few decades and will continue to play a central role in China’s nuclear deterrence system in the coming decades, but many people disagree with this view and cite Learn about the new generation of mobile ground-based ballistic missiles and the new generation of strategic nuclear submarines that the PLA has or will soon be serving as proofs to prove one’s own point of view. They think that China will soon build a new strategic nuclear submarine fleet that can compete with the U.S. Navy. This underwater fleet will be qualitatively and quantitatively improved, and China will give up The policy of “minimum nuclear deterrence” has been adhered to for many years and has been pursued in a more confident and aggressive “limited nuclear deterrence” policy. We will mainly judge China’s future nuclear deterrence strategy and doctrine and the strength of strategic nuclear submarines, while the underwater nuclear deterrent forces will only be explored at the strategic level. The remaining Issues such as whether China will and how to use strategic nuclear submarines to exert military pressure on Taiwan or other countries are beyond the scope of this article.The main point of view of our proposal is to build a large- A stronger strategic nuclear submarine fleet does not necessarily mean that China will abandon the “minimum nuclear deterrence” policy it has long adhered to. In fact, just as China believes, a moderately powerful underwater nuclear deterrent force will enhance the effectiveness of the “minimum nuclear deterrence” policy. In order to clarify this point of view, we will first briefly review the course of the development of underwater nuclear deterrence in the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and France, reviewing the achievements they have made in this area and also discussing with China in this area The development of a comparison. Then we will try to analyze and assess the future size and deployment model of China’s strategic nuclear submarine force.