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本文在不完全合约框架下讨论合资企业中外国投资者增资扩股的微观机制。本文的分析显示,发现产业特征内生决定了合资企业的股权结构安排,事先的股权结构安排实际上是事后收益分配权实现的保障和外化,而事后最优收益分配份额的选择是由产业特征所决定的。随着最终产品生产对外国投资者的技术服务投入依赖程度增加,外国投资者会趋向于选择绝对控股或完全控股,以便获得较高的事后收益分配权。在全球化背景下,外国投资者的产业和生产方式选择变化最终导致了外方增资扩股及外资进入的独资化。用本文的理论,我们解释了中国外资产业政策变动的内生决定机制。
This article discusses the micro-mechanism of capital increase by foreign investors in joint ventures under the framework of incomplete contracts. The analysis of this paper shows that discovering that the industrial characteristics endogenously determines the equity structure of the joint venture, the prior ownership structure arrangement is actually the guarantee and externalization of the realization of the ex post facto distribution rights, and the choice of the optimal share of the post- Characteristics of the decision. With the increasing dependence on the technical services of foreign investors for the production of the final product, foreign investors tend to choose to have absolute control or full control in order to obtain a higher right of ex-post profit distribution. In the context of globalization, changes in the choices of foreign investors in the industries and modes of production eventually led to the sole proprietorship of foreign capital and foreign capital. Using the theory of this article, we explain the endogenous decision-making mechanism of the change of China’s foreign-funded industrial policies.