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本文将主要分析德勒兹基于运动—影像理论的意识概念。在其专著《电影1:运动—影像》中,德勒兹直接将运动—影像理论作为电影研究方法使用,同时也间接由这个理论提出了不同于现象学的意识概念。现象学将意识视为总是关于某物的意识(toute conscience est conscience de quelque chose)o通过分析这一命题,德勒兹反思了现象学中的主体优先性。这种优先性使现象学无法有效解释无主体的电影运动。针对这一缺陷,德勒兹将目光投向柏格森,并提出:“意识即某物(toute conscience est quelque chose)。”为理解德勒兹的观点,本文将首先回顾德勒兹对于现象学的批评。之后,文章将解释德勒兹的主要思想来源,即柏格森的《物质与记忆》。在该书中,柏格森提出了与胡塞尔不同的另一种意识理论。接下来,文章将展示德勒兹对于柏格森意识理论的发展和推进。这个推进的结果即是运动—影像理论。该理论既能弥补现象学的缺陷,又能为理解电影提供新路径。最后,文章将聚焦于德勒兹对于主体性问题的立场。这一立场将有助于理解德勒兹对于现象学的顾虑及其对于柏格森的青睐。
This article will mainly analyze Deleuze’s concept of consciousness based on the motion-imaging theory. In his monograph “Movie 1: Motion - Image”, Deleuze directly used the theory of motion-image as a method of film research, and at the same time indirectly raised the concept of consciousness different from phenomenology. Phenomenology sees consciousness as always the constellation of things. By analyzing this proposition, Deleuze reflects on the subject’s priority in phenomenology. This prioritization makes phenomenology ineffectual in explaining unmediated film movements. In response to this flaw, Deleuze turned his gaze to Bergson and proposed: “The constellation est quelque chose.” To understand Deleuze’s point of view, this article will first review Deleuze’s Phenomenological criticism. After that, the article will explain Deleuze’s main source of thought, Bergson’s “Material and Memory.” In the book, Bergson proposes another theory of consciousness different from Husserl’s. The article will then show Deleuze’s development and advancement of Bergson’s theory of consciousness. The result of this advance is the motion-imaging theory. This theory can not only make up for the defects of phenomenology, but also provide a new way to understand the movie. Finally, the article will focus on Deleuze’s position on subjectivity. This position will help to understand Deleuze’s phenomenological concerns and its favor for Bergson.