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本文论述了权力寻租的基本理论以及中国权力寻租的现状,认为我国权力寻租产生于我国转型时期的双轨体制背景下,主要产生原因是政府权力过大以及监督制度缺乏。权力寻租造成了经济损失、社会资源浪费等影响,同时带来腐败等社会公害。对此,文中提出了反“权力寻租活动”对策再研究,并认为政府应该分权并加大监督力度来改善权力寻租这个问题。
This paper discusses the basic theory of power rent-seeking and the status quo of rent-seeking in China. It is believed that the rent-seeking of power arises from the two-track institutional background during the transitional period of our country, mainly due to the excessive government power and the lack of supervision system. Power rent-seeking has caused economic losses, waste of social resources, etc., and brought about public nuisance such as corruption. In this regard, the article puts forward a counter-study on the “rent-seeking activities of power” and thinks that the government should decentralize and increase supervision to improve the issue of rent-seeking by power.