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为研究航空公司和机票代理人之间的博弈过程,在分析航空公司和代理人在不同策略下各自的得益基础上,建立了静态博弈模型,并运用演化博弈理论对航空公司的机票直销策略选择与代理人策略选择的互动机制进行了分析.博弈分析结果显示,航空公司和代理商在以下情况时存在进化稳定策略:当代理销售成本高于直销成本时,航空公司会加大直销力度;而航空公司的直销策略比较强势时,当代理商抵制策略的概率会大大增加;航空公司缓和推进直销时,代理会也会采取缓和策略.
In order to study the game process between airlines and ticket agents, a static game model is established based on the analysis of the respective benefits of airlines and agents under different strategies. The evolutionary game theory is used to analyze airlines’ ticket sales strategies And the interaction mechanism of choice and agent strategy selection.The results of game analysis show that there are evolutionary stabilization strategies for airlines and agents in the following situations: when the cost of agency sales is higher than the direct selling cost, the airline companies will increase direct selling; When the airline’s direct selling strategy is relatively strong, the probability of the dealer rejecting the strategy will increase greatly. When the airline alleviates the direct selling, the agency will adopt a mitigation strategy.