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地方政府是理解中国环境污染的着力点,地方主导型经济增长与地方主导型环境治理对环境污染具有强化作用。理论分析表明,中国式财政分权下的双重激励与相关制度缺位是地方政府过度经济增长亲和的根源。为实现快速增长,地方政府有内在的倾向放松环境管制,而污染治理支出不足则造成环境污染加剧。为有效证明上述观点,本文利用我国1990~2012年省级碳排量面板数据进行系统GMM实证检验,分析财政分权对环境污染具有显著的正效应,且得出经济发展水平与碳排放量之间存在EKC假说。
Local governments are the focal point for understanding China’s environmental pollution. Local-led economic growth and local-oriented environmental governance have the reinforcing effect on environmental pollution. Theoretical analysis shows that the dual incentive under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization and the absence of related systems are the root causes of the over-economic growth of local governments. In order to achieve rapid growth, local governments have an inherent tendency to loosen environmental regulation, while inadequate expenditures for pollution control have led to increased environmental pollution. In order to effectively prove this point, this paper uses the provincial GMM empirical data from 1990 to 2012 to analyze the effect of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution, and draws a conclusion that the level of economic development and carbon emissions There is an EKC hypothesis.