论文部分内容阅读
新《预算法》对地方财政预算监督提出了新要求,而我国目前的预算监督还有诸多问题存在。在这一背景下,研究分析预算监督的强化路径有着重要理论价值和现实意义。本文首先简单梳理了国内目前从博弈论视角对预算监督进行研究的现状,以及随后建立了两部门、三主体博弈模型,从博弈论角度分析了预算监督的必要性,以及预算监督过程中的三主体利益和制约关系,最后根据结论给出了加强我国地方预算监督的路径建议。
The new “Budget Law” places new demands on the supervision of local fiscal budgets. However, there are still many problems existing in the current budget supervision in our country. Against this background, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study and strengthen the supervision of budget. This paper first briefly reviews the current status quo of budget supervision from the perspective of game theory, and then establishes a two-departmental and three-subject game model. It analyzes the necessity of budget supervision from the perspective of game theory and three The main interests and the relationship between the constraints, and finally according to the conclusions given to strengthen the local budget supervision of China’s path recommendations.